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Abstract
The numerous conﬂicts that swept Indonesia before and after the fall of
Suharto in 1998 displaced over 1.3million people throughout the country. These
included refugees from the post-election violence in East Timor, and internally
displaced persons (IDPs) from the various internal conﬂicts, such as North
Maluku, Kalimantan and Poso. In October of 2001 the Indonesian government
introduced a policy that was aimed at resolving the problem of displaced people
throughout the archipelago by the end of 2002. The government’s plan con-
tained no details on how this was going to be accomplished other than provid-
ing three options for displaced populations: 1) return home; 2) empowerment
in their place of refuge or; 3) relocation. After this date the IDPs would be han-
dled by the “usual channels,” essentially losing their status as IDPs. This policy
affected the approximately 220,000 people displaced by the violence in North
Maluku to varying degrees. Some were forcefully returned to their homes,
while others were simply ignored. This paper looks at the effects of this pol-
icy and its implementation in North Sulawesi and North Maluku. Additionally
1This paper is based on ﬁeldwork carried out in North Sulawesi in July 2000 and in
North Sulawesi and North Maluku from June 2001 until November 2002 sponsored
by LIPI and Universitas Sam Ratulangi. The research was funded at various points by
the Anthropologists Fund for Urgent Anthropological Fieldwork in coordination with
the Royal Anthropological Institute and Goldsmiths College, University of London and
a Luce Post-doctoral Fellowship from the Research School of Paciﬁc and Asian Studies
at The Australian National University. An earlier version of this paper was presented at
the conference on Sectarian Violence in Eastern Indonesia: Causes and Consequences,
University of Hawaii and the East-West Center, May 16–18. I thank Jon Goss and the
other participants for their comments.
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this paper looks at the politics of returning home for IDPs in this part of Indone-
sia, examining issues such as reconstruction, reconciliation, and the continuing
military presence in the region.
1 Introduction
The numerous conﬂicts that swept Indonesia before and after the
fall of Suharto in 1998 displaced over 1.3 million people through-
out the country.1 These included refugees from the post-election
violence in East Timor, and internally displaced persons (IDPs)
from various internal conﬂicts, such as Poso and North Maluku.
In October of 2001 the Indonesian government introduced a pol-
icy aimed resolving the “problem” of displaced people through-
out the archipelago by the end of 2002. After this date the IDPs
would be handled by the “usual channels,” essentially losing their
status as IDPs. The government’s plan contained no details on
how this was going to be accomplished other than providing three
options for displaced populations: 1) return home (pemulangan);
2) empowerment in their place of refuge (pemberdayaan), or; 3) re-
location (pengalihan) (Sosial, 2001). This new policy was greeted
with confusion by many IDPs, because it was announced at a time
when people were still ﬂeeing from ongoing violence in Poso and
Ambon (Duncan, 2003b). The policy also stipulated that all gov-
ernment aid to the displaced would cease on December 31, 2001.
The government was no longer willing to provide aid speciﬁcally
for displaced people because a “sizeable amount of funds” had been
disbursed to IDPs/refugees that should have gone “for other poor
communities, who represent a larger percentage” (Sosial, 2001).
The central government in Jakarta had come to the realiza-
tion that a failure to deal with the continued presence of displaced
people throughout the nation would “threaten government per-
1This ﬁgure was obtained by the World Food Program by compiling ﬁgures collected
and provided by the various government agencies in each province or affected area. One
problem with this ﬁgure is that there was a clear tendency and incentive for each province
to inﬂate the IDP number so as to receive more money from the central government. (F.
Kok, pers. comm.).
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formance and national development” (Sosial, 2001). Furthermore,
the government’s increasing awareness of jealousy and dissatisfac-
tion between IDPs/refugees and local communities was spurring
it to action. The government’s concern with local/IDP relations
was well placed, as conﬂicts between indigenous communities and
migrants were, in part, what had initially created many of these
IDP situations. While it is clear that a policy response to the IDP
situation was warranted, it is rather unclear whether Jakarta’s strat-
egy took sufﬁcient account of return and reintegration realities at
regional and local levels.
In Halmahera, for example, regional ofﬁcials considered rec-
onciliation and the smooth return of IDPs as pivotal in their local
redistricting process. They worried that a poor handling of the
IDP situation, or a return to violence would affect this process
and possibly cost them their hoped for autonomy as new districts
(kabupaten). There were also political concerns about the continu-
ing presence of IDPs and its implication for the 2004 general elec-
tions. Some ofﬁcials in North Sulawesi and Ambon thought that
a large number of IDPs could have a negative impact on elections
since IDPs would be easy to manipulate and their votes would be
inexpensive to purchase (Maluku Media Centre, 2003a). Others
accused government ofﬁcials of slowing the return of IDPs for
just this reason, to increase their constituency for upcoming elec-
tions (Manado Post, 2003a). Many IDPs were aware of the power
of their votes and in several instances threatened to boycott elec-
tions if promised aid packages were not delivered (Sinar Harapan,
2004). As discussed below, sometimes interests differed from re-
gion to region and occasionally led to conﬂicting agendas. In addi-
tion to these directly political concerns, there were other “political”
factors affecting government efforts and IDP decisions, including
the continued presence of the military in North Maluku, or lo-
cal government concerns about gaining access to natural resource
exploitation opportunities.
To what extent was national IDP policy formulation politically
reactive? How signiﬁcantly was regional and local policy imple-
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mentation politically driven? In what ways did these dynamics in-
ﬂuence IDP decisions to return to their homes in North Maluku
or stay in their place of refuge? This paper looks at the effects of
IDP policy and its implementation in North Sulawesi and North
Maluku. With the IDP issue still not fully resolved and national
elections imminent, such an examination is timely. How the gov-
ernment handles the return of 220,000 people in North Maluku,
and a further one million elsewhere in Indonesia, will directly im-
pact prospects for social and political stability—especially in re-
gions recovering from conﬂict.
2 The Causes of Displacement in North Maluku
The IDPs from North Maluku were displaced by 10 months of
ethno-religious conﬂict that lasted from August 1999 through July
2000.2 When violence broke out in January of 1999 between Mus-
lim and Christian communities in Ambon, the provincal capital
of Maluku, the northern part of the province (what would soon
become the new province of North Maluku) remained peaceful.3
It was not until mid-August of 1999 that violence erupted on the
island of Halmahera in northern Maluku in the sub-district (keca-
matan) of Kao between Makian migrants and indigenous popula-
tions. These clashes focused on plans by the regional government
to create a new sub-district of Makian Daratan, with its capital at
Malifut, from the southern half of the Kao sub-district. This new
administrative division would consist of all of the Makian villages
that were established in 1975 when the Indonesian government
resettled the Makian in Kao to protect them from a predicted vol-
canic eruption on their home island.4 It was also to include several
2For a more detailed account of the course of the violence see (Nanere, 2000) and
(Duncan, 2001)
3For more on the violence in Ambon see (Human Rights Watch, 1999) and (Klinken,
2001).
4See (Ternate Pos, 2002b) and (Lucardie, 1985) for more on the resettlement of the
Makian.
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Pagu villages and some villages from the sub-district of Jailolo.5
The violence in August lasted only a few days, but tensions lin-
gered. Disturbances broke out again inOctober, this time resulting
in the total defeat of the Makian by the indigenous population. Ap-
proximately 15,000 Makian were forced to ﬂee to the neighboring
islands of Ternate and Tidore. Although the Kao-Malifut conﬂict
was primarily based on ethnic differences, inﬂuenced by events
in Ambon, it soon took on a religious character—as the Makian
are Muslim and the majority of the indigenous people of Kao are
Christian. Violence then broke out in Tidore and Ternate with the
appearance of a suspicious letter calling for Christians in North
Maluku to cleanse the region of Muslims.6 This letter infuriated
Muslims and the resulting riots in early November forced approxi-
mately 13,000 largely Christian IDPs to ﬂee to North Sulawesi and
Halmahera. This period of violence was followed by “Muslim” at-
tacks on the western and southern regions of Halmahera sending
thousands more, largely Christian, IDPs to North Sulawesi and
northern Halmahera.
At the end of 1999, after months of tension, ﬁghting broke out
in Tobelo in northern Halmahera resulting in the deaths of several
hundred Muslims and the complete destruction of their homes
and mosques. The violence then spread throughout Halmahera
and to the nearby islands of Morotai, Bacan and Obi. Provoca-
tive accounts of the violence in Tobelo (Republika, 2000) created
a national uproar that played a role in the creation of the Laskar
Jihad, a group of self-proclaimed Muslim “Holy Warriors,” who
ﬂooded into Maluku several months later to help their religious
brethren.7 These jihad troops, supported by some military per-
5The Pagu villages and those from Jailolo were to be included in the new sub-district
of Makian Daratan to meet government requirements for a minimum number of villages
in a sub-district.
6For an in-depth account of the letter and the rumors surrounding it see (Bubandt,
2003). The letter is reproduced in full in (Nanere, 2000).
7For more on the Laskar Jihad see (Hasan, 2002) and (for a more partisan view)
see (Shoelhi, 2002).
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sonnel and some localMuslim populations, attacked and destroyed
virtually every Christian village in the sub-district of Galela, as well
as other parts of the province. When the large-scale violence ﬁnally
subsided in July of 2000, few regions were untouched by the con-
ﬂict and over 220,000 people (roughly 25 percent of the province’s
population) had been displaced from their homes.
The people ﬂeeing from the conﬂict in North Maluku went to
a number of places inside and outside of the province based largely
on religious identiﬁcation. North Moluccan Muslims primarily
ﬂed to the island of Ternate, the sub-district of Galela (northern
Halmahera), the southern half of the island of Morotai, and the is-
land of Bacan, while a number of Javanese transmigrants from Kao
and Tobelo were removed against their will by the armed forces
and returned to Java. Ternate held the largest concentration of
IDPs in North Maluku with an estimated 100,000 (close to 10%
of the province’s entire population) from various parts of North
Maluku. The Christian diaspora was more widely spread and cov-
ered at least four provinces (North Maluku, Maluku, North Su-
lawesi, and Irian Jaya). Within North Maluku, Christian IDPs
were concentrated in the sub-districts of Tobelo and Kao in north-
ern Halmahera and on the island of Rao, off the west coast of Mo-
rotai. By far the largest concentration of Christian IDPs in North
Maluku was in the sub-district of Tobelo with some estimates as
high as 60,000 people originating from all over the province. Out-
side of the province approximately 35,000 mainly Christians IDPs
were housed in North Sulawesi and additional IDPs ﬂed to Tan-
imbar, Seram, and Papua (Sorong and Manokwari).8
Since the large-scale violence in North Maluku came to an end
in June of 2000, the region has remained relatively calm and by
mid-2001 many displaced began returning to their homes.9 By the
8This list is in no way conclusive. Small numbers of IDPs from North Maluku went
to a numerous other places as well, including Gorontalo, Makassar, and Jakarta.
9There were occasional outbursts of violence, including the destruction of three vil-
lages in Morotai Utara in September of 2002; a “Muslim” attack on Gorua and Wari
(Tobelo) in June 2002; and several kidnappings and shootings in Galela in early 2002.
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end of 2001 some entire communities had already returned such
as the various Makian and Pagu villages in the Malifut region of
northern Halmahera. However, a large number had yet to return,
and many showed no signs of preparing to do so. These people
were the target of the new government policy for resolving the
“IDP problem” released at the end of 2001.
3 Implementation of the New Policy
The Department of Social Affairs in Jakarta devised the policy to
deal with the “IDP problem” throughout Indonesia, seemingly
with little input from the regions housing the IDPs, or the regions
from which they ﬂed. Although the policy directives and budget
came from Jakarta, provincial and regional governments were left
to coordinate the implementation of the policy and to distribute
the funds. In North Sulawesi, the ﬁrst move was the cessation of
government sponsored food aid to IDPs. This aid had primarily
consisted of rice and “side dish money” (uang lauk pauk) that was
supposedly paid to the IDPs during their period of displacement.
This aid, aimed at meeting daily subsistence needs, ofﬁcially con-
sisted of 400 grams of rice and Rp. 1500 per day per person to be
paid in monthly or bimonthly installments. The full amount was
rarely, if ever, distributed. IDPs accused civil servants in charge
of aid distribution of corruption. In their defense, civil servants
claimed that they never received the full amount from Jakarta and
thus could not be blamed for the shortfall. It is likely that there is
truth to both sides of the argument. For example, in one widely
publicized case, a number of people in Ternate were charged with
taking approximately Rp. 79 billion from funds earmarked for
IDPs to ﬁnance a political campaign (Keadilan, 2002).
Although ﬁnal payments were promised by the end of 2001,
they were not made in North Sulawesi until April 2003. Many
IDPs thought that the aid had been stopped to encourage, if not
force, them to return to North Maluku. Government ofﬁcials
replied that the resources had been more urgently needed to fund
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other pressing social needs throughout the archipelago. It is clear,
however, that ofﬁcials were concerned with the growing tensions
between IDPs and local communities, often fueled by the jealously
concerning the aid given to the IDPs (Jakarta Post, 2001, Repub-
lika, 2001, Tempo, 2001). IDP suspicions of aid restriction do
not seem fully implausible given these conditions. However, if
the government had been hoping to encourage the IDPs to return
by cutting off the aid, they had limited success. Corruption and
mismanagement had depleted the aid to such an extent that most
IDPs had learned to cope without it. Furthermore, church groups,
NGOs and others continued to provide aid after the government
had stopped. Displaced people from rural areas who lacked mar-
ketable job skills, and older IDPs who were unable to do the man-
ual labor jobs available, did ﬁnd it more difﬁcult living in urban
IDP camps (such as Manado, Bitung and Ternate) once the aid was
stopped. Thus the policy did hasten the return of a small number
of IDPs, or in many cases it simply displaced them to new, more
rural communities. The second phase of the program was aimed
primarily at displaced people who were living in IDP camps in
North Sulawesi and in Ternate. In North Sulawesi, the announce-
ment of the policy (without an announced budget) created con-
fusion. Although a few copies of the policy did ﬁnd their way to
the IDPs, copies of the budget were never made available. I was
told by the ofﬁcial in charge of handling IDPs in North Sulawesi
that Rp. 5.5 million per family, in cash and material, had been
allocated to return IDPs to North Maluku, though “unofﬁcial” re-
ports suggested amounts as high as Rp. 15 million.10 In any case,
the amounts that families eventually did receive were a fraction of
these sums, sometimes as little as Rp.75,000. Although the pol-
icy was widely discussed and much debated in North Sulawesi and
Ternate, it was virtually unheard of in the rest of North Maluku,
and as late as September of 2002, sub-district ofﬁcials in Tobelo
and Kao had not been informed of the policy—even as IDPs were
10See (Komentar, 2001a) for one such account.
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returning as a result of its implementation in Ternate.
4 Returning Home
The ﬁrst option for IDPs, and the one favored by the government,
was for them to return to their place of origin. One of the largest
obstacles to returning displaced people to their original homes and
villages was the presence of other IDPs in those locales. As the
violence spread through North Maluku in 1999 and 2000, various
waves of IDPs swept through the region, often displacing other
people in their path and occupying their homes. For example,
Muslim IDPs from Tobelo ﬂed to southern Morotai and displaced
Christians in the region who then ﬂed elsewhere. The Christian
IDPs were reluctant to return to Morotai because the people who
had played a role in their own displacement were still present, and
often living in their homes. Most IDPs felt it would only aggravate
tensions, and potentially lead to further conﬂicts, if they returned
home under these conditions. They argued that the resentment
they would feel towards those living comfortably in their houses
would eventually lead to violence. Thus a large number of Chris-
tian IDPs from southern Morotai in Tobelo were reluctant to re-
turn home, yet their continuing presence in Tobelo was cited as
one reason that the Muslim IDPs in Morotai were reluctant to re-
turn to Tobelo.
Large-scale coordination between regional and local govern-
ments could have facilitated the return of these IDPs but such co-
ordination rarely occurred, and in some cases was even discour-
aged. The differing agendas of regional governments and what
they perceived to be their best strategy for reintegrating returnees,
or returning IDPs, further complicated the process. It often meant
that IDP host communities were doing their best to speed up the
pace of returns, while communities recovering from conﬂict were
trying to slow down the pace of returns to ensure a smooth tran-
sition. The former were rarely sympathetic to the needs of the
latter. For example, the city government of Ternate paid no heed
THE POLITICS OF GOING HOME 93
to requests from ofﬁcials in Tobelo to repatriate Muslim IDPs in
stages. Both Muslim and Christian leaders in Tobelo had agreed
that a gradual return of the thousands of IDPs from Ternate was
the best way to ensure their peaceful reintegration into the com-
munity. The city of Ternate, in contrast, was interested in remov-
ing as many IDPs from Ternate as quickly as possible; once they
were gone it was no longer their concern. The same could be
said for the government of North Sulawesi; its primary goal was
to return as many IDPs to North Maluku as possible, regardless of
where they were going, and whether recipient regions were able to
cope with them, or were even aware they were coming.
Moreover, corruption and mismanagement hampered the pro-
gram from the beginning. The government did not always handle
the return of IDPs itself. In some cases the job was sub-contracted
to well-connected local businessmen who were paid based on the
number of families they registered and returned, and they typi-
cally had no concerns about whether the IDPs were returning to
their original homes (as was the ofﬁcial policy) or simply moving
elsewhere in the archipelago. For example, the businessman mov-
ing IDPs from North Sulawesi to North Maluku returned several
hundred IDP families to Tobelo, from whence only a handful had
originated. Since they were being paid for the number of fam-
ilies they returned, they did not make efforts to ensure that the
people they were “returning” were actually IDPs who were going
home nor did they make efforts to coordinate their plans with re-
gional ofﬁcials. As a result, returnees would often arrive in North
Maluku to ﬁnd that no preparations had been made to accommo-
date them. Furthermore, many IDPs in North Sulawesi used the
program as an opportunity to travel to North Maluku, for busi-
ness or pleasure, and signed up with false names, then returned
when they were done (Komentar, 2003c) (Maluku Media Centre,
2003b). Additionally, people fromNorthMaluku visitingManado,
often posed as returning IDPs in order to get the free ticket. Oth-
ers would sign up to “return”, board the boat and receive their aid
payment, then get off the boat and go back to their current homes
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in North Sulawesi. Thus, estimates of IDPs reported as having
returned to their homes are often unreliable.
5 When Is It Safe to Go Home?
The government’s focus on returning IDPs to their place of origin
raised concerns about safety. Howwas it possible for IDPs, govern-
ment ofﬁcials, or aid workers to know when the political situation
was conducive for IDPs to return? Having experienced the vio-
lence ﬁrst hand, many IDPs tended to err on the side of caution.
In contrast, government ofﬁcials tended to make their decisions
rather indiscriminately. It was often evident that, since their supe-
riors in Jakarta had decided that IDPs needed to go home, all else,
including the future safety of the IDPs, was largely irrelevant. At
times, ofﬁcials appeared to have a total disregard for the situation
on the ground, often urging people to return to places at the same
time that new IDPs were arriving from those very locales, ﬂeeing
renewed hostilities. Additionally, ofﬁcials often equated the cessa-
tion of hostilities with safety. For example, in mid-2002 ofﬁcials in
North Sulawesi were deriding IDPs for not returning to Ternate.
They pointed out that the ﬁghting had stopped in 2000 and it had
been “safe” for almost two years. In response to these portrayals of
a safe Ternate, Christian IDPs noted the presence of over 100,000
Muslims IDPs living there (themselves reluctant to go home to
Halmahera), many of whom were occupying their houses. They
were also quick to note that they could only attend church in Ter-
nate on a heavily guarded military base. As a result IDPs gener-
ally disregarded government reports and opinions concerning the
safety of North Maluku.
Most IDP concerns regarding their return to North Maluku
were legitimate ones. However, some IDPs, who themselves did
not plan on returning in the near future, attempted to manufacture
a climate of fear in an effort to persuade others not to go home.
Certain camp leaders were accused of this behavior because, as the
argument went, as soon as the camps closed they would lose con-
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trol over aid distribution. The dissemination of rumors about re-
cent or impending violence in North Maluku played a major role
in these efforts to dissuade people from returning.
To convince the IDPs to return to North Maluku, the North
Sulawesi government took 20 IDPs from various parts of North
Maluku on a survey trip to the region to meet with local ofﬁcials
and alleviate their fears. Conclusions concerning the survey trip
were mixed. I interviewed almost all of the IDPs who took part in
this trip and most were skeptical of the whole process. In general
they had met only with sub-district level ofﬁcials and police, all
of whom guaranteed their safety. However, as many IDPs pointed
out, this was the government’s ofﬁcial position and thus all of the
ofﬁcials had to agree. Meanwhile, according to the government of-
ﬁcials, it was a success and proof that it was safe to go home. IDPs
were unconvinced and regretted that there had been no opportu-
nity to meet independently with local people. Many of the ofﬁcials
who were telling them that it was conducive to return were often
the same people who had promised to protect them in 1999–2000.
One IDP who had been on the contingent to Bacan pointed out
that they had been accompanied by a military escort throughout
their entire visit (the same was true in Morotai), evidence enough
for him that it was prudent to wait.
As an additional incentive, North Sulawesi ofﬁcials promised
IDPs that the North Maluku government and the armed forces
would guarantee their safety. As IDPs saw it, they were being asked
to place their trust, and quite possibly their lives, in the hands of
the very people who had failed them in the past, and whose per-
formance since that time had been rather poor. Both Muslim and
Christian IDPs noted that although it may look safe to ofﬁcials
from outside the region, to NGO representatives, or even to an
anthropologist, they had lived through the violence and were trau-
matized by their past experiences. They maintained a mistrust of
their former neighbors who had often turned on them during the
conﬂict. Ofﬁcials rarely took IDP trauma into account when dis-
cussing their return. Ofﬁcials also seemed to have a completely
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different view of what was meant by the idea of North Maluku
being “conducive” for the IDPs to return. Many Christian IDPs
wanted their churches rebuilt before they returned, as a sign that
Muslims were willing to accept them. However, a leading ofﬁcial
in North Sulawesi said that not all of the IDPs could expect to be
able to rebuild churches or even to worship in public once they re-
turned. He argued that it was safe for them to return, and that they
would have freedom of religion, “but only in their own homes”.
In some cases the government lost its patience waiting for IDPs
to make their decisions. The government of the city of Ternate,
host to a large number of Muslim IDPs from Tobelo who were
reluctant to return, was representative of this impatience. The fe-
rocity of the violence that had taken place in Tobelo and the re-
sulting trauma was a major concern that prevented many Muslims
from returning to Tobelo. Furthermore, the presence of several
thousand Christian IDPs in Tobelo from elsewhere in Halmahera,
many of whom were living in abandoned Muslim homes, caused
them to think twice before returning. Muslim IDPs from To-
belo often said they were not afraid of the locals in Tobelo, but
were nervous about meeting displaced people from elsewhere who
were suffering trauma and might attack them. Furthermore, in the
case of Tobelo proper, most of the Muslims had limited economic
prospects. A large percentage of them had worked either as labor-
ers at the harbor, or had sold goods at the market. Both of these
activities were now controlled by Christians who were unlikely to
give them up.
By the end of 2002, the local population of Ternate was loosing
its patience with the IDPs for a number of reasons. The popula-
tion of IDPs in the town was almost as large as the town population
itself, and many locals were intimidated, citing the arrogance and
violent nature of IDPs from Tobelo. The IDPs had demonstrated
on a number of occasions when they felt their aid had been mis-
appropriated and at times these demonstrations had turned vio-
lent, causing panic among the (largely Christian) Chinese business
community who would temporarily ﬂee. As they ﬂed they would
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order any ships off-loading their goods to return to sea for fear of
looting, and as a result, workers at the harbor could lose several
days wages. This loss of wages translated into anger against the
IDPs. Furthermore, by mid-2002 there was a growing perception
throughout the region (among both Muslims and Christians) that
Muslim IDPs from Tobelo were particularly troublesome. Some
speculated that the economic issues played a major role in their
unwillingness to accept the new status quo.
Regardless of the reasons the IDPs did not want to return to
Tobelo, the national government’s new policy provided the gov-
ernment in Ternate the opportunity to return most of them. Over
the course of a few days in September 2002, several thousand dis-
placed people were shipped to Tobelo, thus solving the IDP prob-
lem in Ternate, but seriously exacerbating it in Tobelo. There were
still tens of thousands of Christian IDPs in Tobelo, many living
in the homes of Muslims, who were not going home in the near
future. The local government was already stretched thin coping
with these Christian IDPs and was now being asked to take care
of thousands of returning Muslim IDPs. Local ofﬁcials were con-
cerned that these difﬁculties, along with a tight job market, could
lead to increased tensions and the possible outbreak of violence.
In June and August of 2002 there had been brief clashes between
Christians and returningMuslim IDPs to the north of Tobelo, and
many thought the arrival of a large number of Muslim IDPs would
exacerbate these tensions.
Reﬂecting the localized and varied nature of conﬂict and post-
conﬂict realities, there have also been a number of success sto-
ries for returning IDPs, and the United Nations considers North
Maluku to be one of the better examples of how to handle the re-
turn of IDPs (PBP, 2003, p. 13). As mentioned previously, virtually
the entire Makian population of the Malifut region had already re-
turned home by mid-2001. They have largely rebuilt their villages
and relations between them and their neighbors in Kao have been
peaceful, even to the point that a joint Kao-Malifut adat council was
established in mid-2003 to ﬁght the expansion of an Australian-
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owned goldmine in the region (LembagaMasyarakat Adat Kao dan
Malifut, 2003). Pagu villagers from the Malifut region who had
ﬂed to Kao had also returned to their villages. In Galela the ma-
jority of people have returned to their homes. Most Muslim IDPs
in Galela returned after the Christian communities were defeated
in mid-2000 and by the beginning of 2003 most Christian villages
had returned or were planning to return in the near future. A large
number of IDPs have also returned to the islands of Obi and Ba-
can in the southern part of the province. Many of these successes
consist of people returning to their homes in regions where there
are not a large number of IDPs from elsewhere, thus they are not
competing with IDPs for aid, nor forcing IDPs from their homes
as returnees in Ternate, Tobelo and Morotai were doing.
6 Ambiguity and Ambivalence: Reconciliation in North
Maluku
Government ofﬁcials, local leaders, and NGOworkers talked con-
sistently about the importance of “reconciliation” to the return and
reintegration of IDPs, yet they rarely clariﬁed exactly what they
meant by it. In interviews with local communities throughout
North Maluku, most people were unable to distinguish between
reconciliation and the simple cessation of ﬁghting. For the most
part, government or military sponsored efforts consisted of short
adat feasts with speeches declaring that reconciliation had taken
place. However, these activities did little to improve relations be-
tween Muslims and Christians. The prevailing lack of faith in gov-
ernment institutions and the armed forces, which had been unable
to prevent the violence, did not help their efforts.
In Galela local ofﬁcials simply told communities that they must
accept that the conﬂict was “the work of God” and thus neither side
was to blame. They hoped this declaration would lead to reconcil-
iation between the two sides. However, this explanation for the
violence was not well received. As one Christian man in Galela
said:
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We are shocked that the government says we cannot
blame anyone, and that we have to look at this as the
work of God. You can call a famine, a drought or a
natural disaster, the work of God but social conﬂict is
different. If a river is turned to blood, you can say that
is a curse sent by God, but the Muslims clearly invaded
us. How can you say that is the work of God? Why do
we have to share equal blame?
It would appear that local governments in North Maluku have
adopted a policy of forgetting. Although this seems like an easy
policy choice to avoid the pitfalls of prosecution and blame, it was
clear from talking to IDPs over the course of ﬁeldwork (bothMus-
lim and Christian) that simply forgetting was not an option. What
are the people of North Maluku being asked to forget? Are they
being asked to forget about the perpetrators and instigators of the
violence? Or to forget about the victims? If it is the latter, most at-
tempts at reconciliation will only increase local resentment against
the government. As Biggar (Biggar, 2001, p. 10) notes in his dis-
cussion of reconciliation: “To suffer an injury and have it ignored
is to be told effectively, ’What happens to you doesn’t matter, be-
cause you don’t matter.”’ He also notes that: “hatred and mistrust
constitute an unstable mixture that, under certain conditions, is li-
able to explode and to rupture the half forgetful present with the
unﬁnished business of the past.” As the events of 1999–2000 ex-
emplify, the people of North Maluku are not known for their short
memories.
In addition to the limited attempts by local government, some
local and international NGOs made efforts at reconciliation. They
tried to facilitate reconciliation throughout the province with a va-
riety of methods, including seminars on “peace journalism,” and
multi-day workshops. It remains to be seen (as of late 2003) if
these efforts will succeed, as many of them, particularly those of
international NGOs, were not done in-situ. Furthermore, many
people in North Maluku pointed out the irony that the people
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who attend the workshops and forums were precisely the people
who wanted reconciliation. The people who refused to reconcile
their differences, and who never attended such workshops, were
the ones who might have beneﬁted from such activities. Often-
times, moderates would attend the meetings, only to be shouted
down upon their return by members of the community who were
unwilling to move on.
The local government in Tobelo, northern Halmahera, is hop-
ing to stimulate reconciliation by reviving interest in adat (Dun-
can, 2003c). Leading government ofﬁcials believe that a return to
adat is the best answer to facilitating reconciliation. Their ideas
are based on the notion that prior to the violence people identiﬁed
themselves with their religion (asMuslim or Christian) rather than
their ethnic identity (Tobelo). They hope that a return to adat will
switch people’s focus of identity to their ethnicity and make them
less susceptible to religious-based provocation. As part of this goal
of increasing awareness of local tradition, there have been moves
to add Tobelo language classes to school curriculums, and a plan to
construct adat houses in every village to serve as forums for conﬂict
resolution.
7 The Military Presence
The continuing military presence in the region also had an effect
on people’s decisions to return home. As mentioned above, the
armed forces played a role in facilitating “reconciliation” activi-
ties, but elements of the armed forces had also played a role in
the violence. There were numerous accusations of various levels
of military involvement in the ﬁghting, ranging from standing by
as violence took place to the selling and renting of weapons and
direct participation by individual soldiers or entire units (Suadey,
2000, Aditjondro, 2001). Opinions of the armed forces, as in Am-
bon, tended to follow religious lines. Muslim communities in
North Maluku generally tended to trust the military in the re-
gions where they were victims, such as Tobelo, Galela, andMalifut.
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In contrast, Christian communities tended not to trust the armed
forces at all. The inability of the army to prevent the outbreak of
the violence, and the widespread belief in the complicity of the
armed forces in the continuation of the violence left many Chris-
tian communities with little faith in the armed forces and police.
Tobelo provides a ready case study. Many Christians there saw
the continued military presence up until the end of 2002 as a sign
that reconciliation had not occurred, and that Muslims were un-
willing to co-exist. Mistrusting the military and believing it had
provided cover forMuslim infractions, Christians rejectedMuslim
demands for the stationing of troops in their districts. When Mus-
lims were repatriated to Tobelo fromTernate, the local government
refused to let troops be stationed in the village of Gamhoku. The
Muslims were welcome to stay, but without military support. The
Muslims declined and most settled in Togoliua to the south, not
feeling safe without the armed forces to guarantee their safety.
A general lack of faith in the armed forces seemed to be de-
veloping in North Maluku, as it was in much of Indonesia during
2002. Locals felt that the armed forces wanted to maintain the
civil emergency as it provided them with lucrative opportunities
to make money through various means. Many believe that the
sporadic violence that broke out in North Halmahera in 2002 was
instigated, or least encouraged, by the armed forces. After each
incident, people were encouraged to pay the military protection
money if they wanted to move around. Furthermore, the longer
things remained unstable, the longer large businesses in the re-
gion, such as Barito Paciﬁc and the Newcrest gold mine would
need their services.11 An additional concern was the relationships
between soldiers and local women. It was estimated by leaders in
Tobelo that when one army unit rotated out of Tobelo in late 2001,
they left behind over 40 unmarried pregnant women. It was not
just Tobelo where the military was a problem. The large military
11The state of civil emergency was lifted in March of 2003. For more on the business
dealings of the Indonesian armed forces see (McCulloch, 2000)
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presence in on the island of Obi led many who had not ﬂed the
violence, to send their daughters, and in some cases their wives, to
Manado to escape harassment from soldiers.
8 Relocation
Although the government favored returning IDPs to their origi-
nal homes, ofﬁcials were well aware that in some cases that would
not be possible. As a result the government provided the option of
relocation, which in most cases meant taking part in a transmigra-
tion project either within North Maluku or in North Sulawesi.
Within North Maluku there was one transmigration settlement
constructed by the end of 2002. This project was aimed at Chris-
tian IDPs in Manado with a ﬁshing background. The settlement
was built to house approximately 40 families on the small, isolated
island of Mayu (also known as Batang Dua) in the Moluccas Sea
between Halmahera and northern Sulawesi. Another development
in North Maluku that affected the relocation of IDPs, although
not explicitly a transmigration project, was the government’s “re-
opening” of the island of Makian for settlement.12 The island was
ofﬁcially “re-opened” with much fanfare in June of 2002. The re-
opening of Makian can be seen, in part, as providing an option for
Makian IDPs who did not want to return to the Malifut region.
InNorth Sulawesi, the Department of Transmigration had built
two transmigration sites by the end of 2002 aimed at relocating
Christian IDPs from North Maluku. The ﬁrst site, Kakenturan
Dua, was built in the sub-district of Modoinding on the western
border of the district of Minahasa. This site was plagued by com-
plications from the outset. The neighboring district (kebupatan)
of Bolaang Mongondow also claimed the land. Ofﬁcials from the
district government of Bolaang Mongondow refused to accept the
12The island of Makian was evacuated in 1975 as described above. After that time peo-
ple slowly moved to the island in small numbers, but since the island was ofﬁcially closed
there were no public services. In 1997 the island had a population of 5,015 people (Ter-
nate Pos, 2002a). The island was opened with the issuance of SK Bupati No 284 / 2002.
For more on the re-opening of the island see (Ternate Pos, 2002b)
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project, claiming that they needed the land for their own people.
The district regent of BolaangMongondow said he could not guar-
antee the safety of the IDPs if they were settled there, and their
presence could lead to new social problems (Komentar, 2001b). In
fact, there was much more than land at stake. The transmigration
site was built in one of the last large stretches of forest in the region.
The district that developed it stood to make a signiﬁcant amount
of money from the sale of the timber. There were also rumors of
gold in the region. Before the matter was resolved, and against the
objections of the government of Bolaang Mongondow, the IDPs
were moved into the settlement. They were smuggled in during
the middle of the night to avoid any confrontation. The second
transmigration settlement, Serey-Sangkilang in eastern Minahasa,
was plagued by conﬂicting land claims as well; the government
had bought the land from one family, but another family claimed
ownership (Komentar, 2002) This issue also remained unresolved,
but the IDPs were moved in regardless. The anger in these cases
was directed at the government; however there were worries that
it could be vented on the IDPs.
In addition to the problems of conﬂicting land claims, poor
planning and poor site selection hampered these two sites. For ex-
ample, although the Kakenturan Dua transmigration project site
was touted as a perfect location for lucrative vegetable farming,
the chosen land was unsuitable for growing vegetables, raising the
question of how the new settlers would earn a living. Furthermore,
the IDPs were moved in before the settlement was ﬁnished, before
there was a school for their children, or a road into the settlement.
The other transmigration site, Serey-Sangkilang, was designated
for ﬁshermen; however the hulls of the boats provided by the gov-
ernment as part of the settlement had already rotted by the time
IDPs arrived.
Within the municipality of Manado a large resettlement site
was built by the provincial government for IDPs in the village of
Pandu. This was originally only supposed to be temporary hous-
ing, and families were to be granted use rights over the houses,
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not ownership. This development was plagued by conﬂicting land
claims as well (Manado Post, 2001, Sulut Post, 2002). To stem
the problem of jealousy among poorer segments of the indigenous
community, some locals were granted land by the government on
an adjoining plot, but were not given houses. They were not satis-
ﬁed with this arrangement and demanded housing. An additional
problem was that many IDPs who had claimed houses in the site
continued to live in the city. Locals were upset with the sight of
hundreds of vacant houses that they were not allowed to use them-
selves. At various points these tensions broke out into conﬂict,
resulting in the destruction of resettlement houses, and physical
attacks on IDPs (Duncan, 2003a).
9 Empowerment: The Integration of IDPs
The government’s focus on returning or relocating IDPs overshad-
owed the “empowerment” option; it preferred to have IDPs return
to their homes or to take part in transmigration schemes. This
third option was aimed at providing IDPs with an “opportunity
to start a new life within an existing community, with assistance
and facilitation from the government, whether in terms of employ-
ment or facilities to make it easier for them to earn a living” (Sosial,
2001). Since most local governments wanted the IDPs to leave,
this option was rarely discussed and the topic was often avoided in
discussions with IDPs until mid-2003.
In Ternate the city government eventually moved the major-
ity of the IDPs back to Tobelo as discussed above. In North Su-
lawesi the government had concerns that if too many IDPs stayed
in Manado and Bitung, social conﬂict could develop (Duncan,
2003b). Ofﬁcials voiced these fears on numerous occasions to en-
courage the IDPs to leave North Sulawesi. In one meeting with
IDPs in North Sulawesi, the ofﬁcial in charge of handling IDPs
in the province concluded his discussion by saying: “If you [the
IDPs] do not go back to Maluku Utara, in ten years my chil-
dren will kill your children, since this is our homeland not yours.”
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There have been low-level conﬂicts in North Sulawesi since the
arrival of the IDPs in November of 1999 (Republika, 2001). In
early May of 2003 these conﬂicts erupted into violence again in
Bitung, when an argument between local youth and IDP youth
turned into a large-scale conﬂict that lasted several days, necessi-
tating the intervention of the army (Manado Post, 2003a, Manado
Post, 2003b, Komentar, 2003a, Komentar, 2003b).
It had become apparent to all involved by the end of 2002, that
a large number of IDPs particularly those fromTernate and Tidore,
felt they could not go home in the near future, and many did not
intend to return. The majority of them had sold their houses in
North Maluku when possible and it is likely that a large number
will remain in North Sulawesi, particularly inManado and Bitung.
Some IDPs who have spent the last few years living in Manado in
Ternate see no reason to return to their homes in North Maluku
where they feel they have fewer opportunities and their children
will have a lower quality education.
Due to their reluctance to encourage IDPs to stay in North Su-
lawesi, the “empowerment” option remained somewhat of a mys-
tery. During 2002 it was never explained to the IDPs, and they
were never informed of their rights or choices regarding this op-
tion. In April of 2003, the government of North Sulawesi insti-
gated a “Termination” program to end the IDP problem, granting
each family a “Termination Package” worth Rp. 2.5 million. Ac-
ceptance of the package meant that the family in question relin-
quished IDP status and any claims to future IDP aid, and became
registered members of the local community. There were several
options in this “Termination Package”, including a “trading stall”
(kios) option in which a family received a glass fronted cabinet and
Rp. 1.3 million worth of goods to sell. The remaining Rp. 1.2
million was deducted by the government for “distribution and ad-
ministration.” Another option was the “bakery” option in which
an IDP family received approximately Rp. 2 million worth of bak-
ery equipment and baking supplies, again forfeiting the rest of the
funds for administrative fees. Reportedly IDPs who had already
THE POLITICS OF GOING HOME 107
registered and been returned to NorthMaluku, but had come back
to North Sulawesi, were excluded from this settlement. The ma-
jority of IDPs who chose these options were from Ternate and
Tidore, the two locations where Christian IDPs in North Sulawesi
were most reluctant to return. These efforts did not resolve the
“problem” of IDPs in North Sulawesi and several thousand were
still living in IDP camps at the end of 2003 (Kompas, 2003).
10 Effects of the Government’s Policy?
What have been the outcomes of the government’s attempts to
“solve the IDP problem” by the end of 2002? To what extent has
Jakarta’s policy been successful? Obviously, the long-term effects
of the government’s handling of IDPs and their return, relocation,
or integration will not become evident for some time. Yet even the
current situation seems to be in dispute. According to the Depart-
ment of Social Affairs its efforts were quite effective. They claimed
to have resettled over 1 million people in under 1 year; leaving only
200,000 IDPs in Indonesia as of May of 2003 (Jakarta Post, 2003).
However, there clearly have been political motivations to paint the
situation in a positive light. The central government is especially
eager to solve the IDP problem before national elections in mid
2004 (PBP, 2003). Furthermore, since there was no more money
forthcoming, it has also been in the interest of local ofﬁcials to play
down totals of those still displaced and convey resolution as well.
It is not surprising, then, to discover that government ﬁgures
tended to fall signiﬁcantly below the estimates of other institutions.
In June of 2003, the United Nations Ofﬁce for the Coordina-
tion of Humanitarian Affairs estimated that approximately 660,000
IDPs remained throughout Indonesia (PBP, 2003, p. 37). Three
months later, focusing just on the case North Sulawesi, Church
World Service estimated that 13,000 IDPs had not yet returned to
North Maluku (Church World Service, 2003).
Beyond the numbers, it is also too early to assess the ultimate
qualitative impact of government policy upon people’s lives. In
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North Maluku, among those who have returned home, such as
Christian IDPs returning to Ternate from North Sulawesi, many
are still living in camps—under much the same conditions as in
North Sulawesi, or in some cases worse (Tempo Interaktif, 2003).
Furthermore, the ongoing conﬂict in Aceh, as well ﬂare-ups in
Central Sulawesi in late 2003 ensure that there are again newly
displaced populations in the country. With no money currently
allocated for IDPs in the 2004 government budget, it remains to
be seen if durable solutions to the problems of displacement and
forced migration can be found in Indonesia.
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